

Country Reports Overview

**Working
together
for a just and
sustainable
world free
from poverty
and hunger**

**Reporting Period
January 2024
to December 2024**

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
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1. Introduction

The 2025 Alliance2015 Country Report provides an overview of joint initiatives and plans of Alliance2015 members in countries, based on inputs collected through a standard form in the first quarter of 2026. It serves as our main knowledge management tool for country-level collaboration, capturing key information on country-level engagement, advocacy, resource mobilization, emergency preparedness and response and programming.


Out of 55 countries where at least two members are present, we received reports from 381. These reports account for 69% of the Alliance2015 countries with at least two members present. This remains a strong result, especially considering all the changes the sector has gone through in 2025.

Serving as both a reflection and a planning tool, the Country Report aims to inform decision-making within the network, shape implementation groups' plans, and influence the strategy renewal process ongoing during this year.



Colour Legend:

- 1. Countries who submitted the report.
- 2. Countries with at least two Alliance2015 members, who did not submit the report.
- 3. Countries with only one Alliance2015 member present, not required to submit the report.



G2 – Reports submitted vs members' presence per region

The graph shows the distribution of reports across regions, confirming that **input was received from all areas where members are active**. **Asia** recorded the highest response rate at 93%. In **Africa**, 12 out of 20 countries submitted reports, reflecting a slight decrease from 65% last year to 60%. The lowest response rate was observed in **Latin America and the Caribbean**, where participation declined from 67% (4 out of 6) in the previous reporting cycle to 50% (4 out of 8). By contrast, **Europe** showed a positive trend, with the response rate increasing from 50% (2 out of 4) in 2024 to 60% (3 out of 5). In the **MENA region**, response rates also improved slightly, rising from 71% (5 out of 7) to 75% (6 out of 8).

2. Leadership and level of engagement

2.1. Overall Engagement Trends

The report highlights a convergence between countries' levels of engagement and their eagerness to respond. **Countries belonging to Level 1 (high) and Level 2 (medium) show the highest response rates, at 8 out of 9 and 10 out of 13.** Among Level 2 countries, Burkina Faso, Moldova, and Venezuela did not submit the reports. On the other hand, 20 out of 33 Level 3 countries responded, constituting 60% of L3 countries, almost as last year's where 16 out of 27 (59%) Level 3 countries responded.

L1 Countries High

Peru, Niger, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Liberia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya.

L2 Countries Medium

Nepal, Iraq, Lebanon, Bolivia, Malawi, Haiti, Venezuela, Mali, Central African Republic, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Burkina Faso.

L3 Countries Standard

Albania, Armenia, Cambodia, DR Congo, Georgia, Honduras, India, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Myanmar, Palestine, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Madagascar, South Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe

Desired level of engagement

Countries were asked to indicate how satisfied they are with their current level of engagement and whether they would like any changes.

Overall, the largest share of countries (42%) expressed a preference to maintain the current level of engagement, suggesting **general satisfaction with existing arrangements**. At the same time, **29% indicated a desire to increase engagement**, pointing to opportunities for deeper collaboration and stronger involvement across the network. These countries are Afghanistan (L2), Albania (L3), Bangladesh (L1), CAR (L2), Malawi (L2), Pakistan (L1), Syria (L3), Yemen (L3), Sierra Leone (L1), Sudan (L3), Lebanon (L2).

A smaller group of countries - the Democratic Republic of the Congo (L3), Georgia (L3), Jordan (L3), Mali (L2), Pakistan (L1), Somalia (L3), Ukraine (L1) - **are still unaware of their country's engagement level**, despite attempts from the Hub to communicate this information. Possible reasons include staff turnover and inadequate communication between incoming Country Directors and management.

In Myanmar, there are plans to increase engagement from 2026, while in Cambodia, limited in-country network presence constrains engagement, which currently takes place primarily through headquarters.

Overall, the findings suggest a stable foundation of engagement across countries, with a notable share seeking to expand their involvement and a need for clearer communication to support informed participation.

Level of satisfaction with the current level of engagement	Countries
It should increase (11)	Afghanistan (L2), Albania (L3), Bangladesh (L1), CAR (L2), Malawi (L2), Pakistan (L1), Syria (L3), Yemen (L3), Sierra Leone (L1), Sudan (L3), Lebanon (L2)
It should stay as it is (15)	Bolivia (L2), Haiti (L2), Honduras (L3), Iraq (L2), Lao PDR (L3), Liberia (L1), Mozambique (L3), Nepal (L2), Niger (L1), Palestine (L3), Peru (L1), Philippines (L3), Sri Lanka (L3), Uganda (L1), Ethiopia (L1)
We would like to receive more information on the engagement level (4)	Armenia (L3), India (L3), Kyrgyzstan (L3), Tajikistan (L2)

Introducing as a network to institutional stakeholders

Responses to this question indicate that **only a limited number of countries consistently present themselves as a network when engaging with external stakeholders**. Ethiopia stands out as the only country where members **always** position themselves as part of a network. A small group of countries - including Liberia and Pakistan (both L1), as well as Armenia, Nepal, and Somalia - report doing so frequently.

However, **the majority of countries fall into the “occasional²” or “rare³” categories**, suggesting that network-level positioning is **not yet systematically embedded in external engagement practices**. In addition, six countries - Cambodia, Georgia, Jordan, Mali, Sri Lanka, Sudan - report never presenting themselves as a network, pointing to significant gaps in collective visibility and representation.

Compared to last year - when the combined share of countries selecting “Always,” “Frequently,” or “Occasionally” rose from 47% in 2023 to 62%, indicating a positive trend - a decline is observed this year, **with 55% of countries reporting that they present themselves as a network**.

What emerges from these findings is an opportunity to strengthen how members represent the network externally, particularly in contexts where joint positioning could enhance influence, coherence, and visibility.

Qualification of collaboration among Alliance2015 members

Definitions

Strategic: we have a shared Alliance2015 country plan/framework for cooperation that describes our objectives and that is embedded in our individual country strategies.

Intentional/proactive: at regular intervals, we discuss to identify our added value, strengths and opportunities. We identify joint initiatives that make sense in our context and translate them into a formal or informal plan to guide our joint actions.

Reactive/ad hoc: when there is a new collaboration opportunity coming, we discuss options to work together.

Loose: we are in touch and exchange about the general situation in country, but in our context, we do not see concrete opportunities for collaboration.

An assessment of how members perceive their level of collaboration across countries highlights **varying degrees of coordination and network maturity**, ranging from non-existent or informal arrangements to more structured, intentional, and proactive collaboration models.

At one end of the spectrum, a small number of countries report that a network structure is either **non-existent or not operational**. This is the case in Georgia and Cambodia, while in Sri Lanka engagement is described as largely individual rather than collective, indicating the absence of a coordinated platform.

A group of countries characterize their network as “**loose**,” including India, Iraq, Mali, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Sudan. In these contexts, collaboration exists but remains informal, with limited structure or strategic alignment guiding joint efforts.

The **largest category** consists of countries where engagement is described as **reactive or ad hoc**. This includes Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru, Ukraine, Sierra Leone, and Syria. In these settings, collaboration tends to occur **in response to specific opportunities or needs**, rather than as part of a planned or systematic approach.

Finally, a smaller group of countries demonstrates more **intentional and proactive engagement**. This includes the Central African Republic, Honduras, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Uganda, Lebanon, and Ethiopia. In these contexts, network members are more likely to **engage in structured coordination, forward planning, and joint strategic initiatives**.

Overall, the findings highlight **significant variability in how networks function across countries**. While some contexts show strong, proactive collaboration, many remain in earlier or less structured stages, pointing to opportunities for strengthening coordination mechanisms, strategic alignment, and more systematic joint engagement.

2.2. Collaboration Models and Meeting Practices

Regular coordination meetings appear to play a key role in enabling more structured and effective collaboration. Overall, **24 out of 38 countries report holding regular meetings**, most commonly on a monthly or quarterly basis.

Countries with more frequent interactions - such as monthly or bi-monthly meetings - tend to demonstrate clearer examples of joint programming, coordinated donor engagement, and more structured advocacy efforts, as seen in contexts like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Malawi, Pakistan, Uganda, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia and Niger. In contrast, the 14 countries that do not hold regular meetings often show less consistent or more ad hoc collaboration patterns, suggesting that meeting regularity is an important enabler of stronger collective action.

Where meetings are irregular or absent, collaboration tends to remain ad hoc. However, some countries still manage to engage in joint initiatives despite the lack of a regular coordination structure. For example, joint projects have been reported in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Myanmar, Tajikistan, and Ukraine, while joint advocacy efforts have taken place in Haiti and Tajikistan. This suggests that, **although regular meetings facilitate more structured collaboration, they are not a strict prerequisite for joint action.**


3. Joint Initiatives and Strategic Compass Implementation

3.1 Past Joint Initiatives

Joint projects

Joint project work remains the clearest vehicle for engagement


The countries reporting their engagement in joint projects are **12 (32%)**: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Malawi, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palestine, Tajikistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia⁴. This represents a **considerable (15%) decrease in countries reporting engagement in joint projects compared to 2024**, where 16 out of 34 (47%) reported participating in joint projects.



G3 - Joint projects per type

**Countries reporting joint projects could select more than one type of project.*


These results show an overall even participation in joint projects compared to 2024, but a shift in the type of projects reported, with a **decrease of humanitarian projects** (reported by 12 countries in 2024), and development (7 in 2024), and a **slight increase in Nexus projects** (2 in 2024).



G4 – Joint projects per Impact Goal


Liberia (L1) and Honduras (L3) members are monitoring Global Gateway projects. A slight change was also observed in joint programming focus, against the three Alliance2015 Impact Goals (IG). Countries that reported joint programming focusing on IG1, climate resilience, slightly decreased (-1); there was an increase in countries reporting joint programming on the IG2, food systems strengthening, and IG3, equitable partnerships (+2 each).

Joint positioning and donor engagement initiatives



G5 – Joint positioning and donor engagement initiatives

Alliance2015 members jointly engaged with a variety of donors across 14 countries (37%). **This is a proportional decrease compared to 2024**, where half the countries (47%, 15) jointly positioned and engaged with a variety of donors. In 2023, 39% of countries positioned jointly, and in 2022, 29% did.



G6– Current level of engagement with the EU Delegation and ECHO

The most frequent donor engagement reported in 2025 was with ECHO and EU Delegations (all but one). Other donors include the Irish, Italian and German governments, NORAD, the World Bank and African Development Bank.

There is a growing trend toward **more coordinated donor engagement** across countries. Examples include **Uganda** engaging jointly with AICS, ECHO, and AGRA5, and **Ethiopia** accessing new EU units through Alliance2015 visibility. In **Pakistan**, partners are aligning efforts around COP30 and ECHO-funded DRR and climate initiatives, while **Kyrgyzstan** is prioritising Swiss Development Cooperation and Green Climate Fund positioning with Helvetas. In **Haiti**, stakeholders are also advancing ECHO proposals through joint approaches.

Several **barriers continue to constrain effective engagement**. Donor fatigue and shrinking funding envelopes, highlighted in contexts such as **Liberia** and **Ethiopia**, are a growing concern. In addition, mismatches between donor cycles and internal budget pipelines complicate planning, while competition among members tends to intensify when resources are limited. Finally, in some countries, including **Sudan** and **Yemen**, Alliance2015 still faces relatively low recognition among donors.


Armenia, Ethiopia, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Syria (5 out of the 14 countries that engaged with donors) are the only countries who reported having produced **Joint Capacity Statements**. In 2024, four (4) countries also stated having produced Joint Capacity Statements, among which Armenia and Ethiopia.

There is a clear and **growing demand for enhanced donor intelligence support**, with many countries increasingly seeking assistance in key areas. These include mapping opportunities under **Global Gateway**, accessing **private foundations** and **climate finance**, and gaining deeper insights into donor priorities and competitor landscapes. Countries also request support in facilitating more coordinated, joint approaches to engaging donors. Countries requesting support include **Uganda, Ethiopia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Armenia**.


Joint advocacy

Joint project work remains the clearest vehicle for engagement

Out of 38 responding countries, **14 reported having jointly worked on advocacy, external events and initiatives, thus marking a slight decrease from last year** (with 15 joint advocacy initiatives, out of 36 respondents). These countries are Bangladesh, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Tajikistan, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia.



G7 – Joint advocacy



G8 – Joint advocacy per Impact Goal

For the first time in recent years, member organizations engaged in joint advocacy for **Impact Goal 1** (climate resilience), **2** (food systems transformation) and **3** (equitable civil society partnerships) to an equal extent.

Notable strong practices include:

- **Nepal:** joint **Policy Paper on the Global Gateway**, in coordination with the Brussels Alliance2015 Hub.
- **Liberia:** structured engagement in the **national INGO forum** (Concern: co-Chair, WHH: treasurer) enabling close involvement in policy advocacy towards the Government, especially to support the comprehensive Food and Nutrition Security Assessment as well as the re-launched 'Cadre Harmonisé'. Alliance2015 is seen as a trusted partner. Participation in global processes such as Nutrition for Growth and Scaling Up Nutrition. A joint advocacy and fundraising strategy and plan with Sierra Leone are established, ensuring alignment and commitment.
- **Malawi:** submission, through the national Right to Food coalition, for the **Universal Periodic Review** about Malawi by the UN Human Rights Council, recommending the government to fast-track the review and enactment of the draft Food and Nutrition Bill. Conducting a **Food Systems Assessment**.
- **Ethiopia:** engagement with EU Delegation (Economy, Trade, Private Sector Development, and Regional Integration Unit) which allowed Alliance2015 to be invited to the **EU–Africa Business Forum**. Receiving updates on the **EU Civil Society Roadmap**, which strengthens collaboration in the long term.
- **Sierra Leone:** engagement and launch event with the Irish Embassy under the LIFE program. Engagement with the German Embassy in Freetown to discuss Alliance2015 joint work on health and livelihoods.

Countries involving local partners stand out for stronger policy relevance

- **Liberia** and **Malawi** provide the best examples of structured CSO involvement (be it under a multi-country research program on food systems and value chain development, or under the national Right to Food Coalition), at times with double-digit partner participation.
- This aligns very strongly with Impact Goal 2 (both being related to food systems transformation) and **Impact Goal 3** on equitable civil society partnerships, showing clear learning pathways for other countries.
- It was noted that, as the overall governance focus shifts towards **localization**, local partners are being actively involved to effectively collaborate with policymakers and influence their agendas, likely as successfully if not more than INGOs.

Barriers to joint advocacy remain consistent with 2024

- In several countries joint Alliance2015 tools are still not used. In those others where they are used, tools like the Advocacy Strategy, the Policy Monitoring, and the Alliance2015 Updates are found useful, however not straightforward to share.

Communications, Visibility, and Knowledge Sharing

Across the 38 reporting countries, **production of joint visibility and communication products was limited** and concentrated in only a handful of contexts. Countries that did report producing such products include Haiti, where Concern and Welthungerhilfe jointly produced a food systems study, Malawi, which published a Food Systems Assessment/Analysis report jointly, and Peru, which launched the Global Hunger Index (GHI) 2025 country report as a coordinated Alliance2015 event. Liberia also reported joint efforts contributing to major national analyses such as the Comprehensive Food and Nutrition Security Assessment and support to the Cadre Harmonisé process, both of which serve as highly visible joint knowledge products. A few countries – such as Ethiopia and Nepal – did not necessarily publish products during the reporting period but did engage in joint preparation of position papers or have plans underway for joint studies (e.g., on nexus, climate finance, or food systems).

Regarding **joint trainings, learning exercises, or capacity strengthening initiatives**, participation was again **relatively limited**. Countries reporting concrete activities included India, which hosted joint workshops on climate change, nutrition smart communities, and civil society capacity strengthening, and Haiti, where partners participated jointly in Alliance2015 webinars on passporting and shared resources. Liberia reported substantial joint learning engagement, including learning visits, joint research participation, and training engagements with government and CSO stakeholders, while in Pakistan, several structured joint capacity strengthening efforts were undertaken under large multiyear resilience programmes (e.g., BRAVE, BRAND).


Joint Emergency Preparedness and Anticipatory Actions

The countries that engaged in Joint Emergency Preparedness and Anticipatory Actions in 2025 were **Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Nepal, and Pakistan** (7, 18%). Among these, **Afghanistan** was the only country reporting both the occurrence of a disaster and the **launch of a joint response**. In Ethiopia, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Pakistan, respondents indicated that a disaster did occur, but no joint response was initiated. Nepal, meanwhile, reported that no disaster occurred.

In comparison, in 2024 only 9 out of 25 countries reported engagement in the above-mentioned activities. These were Bangladesh, Bolivia, Haiti, India, Kenya, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, and Palestine. The findings suggest that in countries such as India, Lebanon, Nepal, and Pakistan, engagement in JEPREP is becoming more firmly established and increasingly embedded in their operational approaches. Unlike last year, no information is available on type and depth of preparedness exercises conducted across countries.

3.2 Planned Joint Initiatives

Collaborative joint projects remain the most favoured type of initiative planned for 2026, alongside joint donor engagement and positioning.



G 9 – Planned Joint Initiatives

In contrast, there has been a notable decrease in planned joint advocacy activities compared to the previous year (from 18 out of 34 to 12 out of 38).

Interest in JEPREP has increased significantly, rising from 5 initiatives in 2024 to 12 in 2025. Similarly, **joint visibility and communications activities have doubled**, growing from 7 in 2024 to 14 in 2025. Other categories show more moderate increases, including joint learning and “other” activities.

Joint projects

Across 22 countries, there are plans to advance joint proposals, reflecting a strong push for collaboration. In **Afghanistan**, this includes developing a strategic plan for joint initiatives, while in **Bangladesh** discussions are underway to prepare a concept note for the Green Climate Fund. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, partners are working on a joint climate resilience project targeting multiple donors. **Haiti** is seeing both joint project submissions and a study on food systems, and in **Malawi** efforts are focused on strengthening joint positioning around food systems.

Joint positioning and donor engagement initiatives

In 20 countries, Alliance2015 members intend to jointly position and engage with donors. These include ECHO and the Delegation, as well as private donors, the Green Climate Fund, Swiss Development Cooperation, Sida, French embassy, the World Bank and African Development Bank.

Joint advocacy

The appetite for joint advocacy was expressed in many countries, though not all have already decided on their plans.

In some cases, greater clarity on the strategic direction to be taken would also determine the kind of support required from the Alliance2015 Hub (Afghanistan). In others, existing projects about local governance, private sector development, circular economy, and energy efficiency might represent the basis for joint advocacy efforts (Albania).

In other countries like Ethiopia, the Global Hunger Index (GHI) will remain the national priority for Alliance2015. Additionally, discussions are ongoing on a new topic for joint advocacy in the next year, and support to assist in identifying such relevant topics would be welcome. In Haiti, member organizations are always engaged in joint advocacy or participate in external events, but more as CLIO (Haitian NGO forum) than as Alliance2015.

In Liberia, a Vice President level GHI launch is planned this year, given its relevance to the themes of climate smart agriculture and food sovereignty. In Malawi, Alliance2015 members planned to combine the GHI launch together with their Food Systems Analysis dissemination, and support from the Hub would be beneficial. Meetings with new government officials and presentations of Alliance2015 are also in the plans.

The launch of the 2025 GHI country report took place in March 2026 in Peru, in the format of a working table with decision makers, donors, and civil society.

Communications, Visibility, and Knowledge Sharing

Across the reporting countries, interest in developing joint visibility and communication products is significantly higher than the number of products actually produced in the reporting year, showing a clear ambition to strengthen collective messaging in 2026 and beyond.

These countries provided explicit plans, themes, or next steps:

- **Afghanistan** — Expressed intention to develop joint visibility and communication products depending on donor rules and forthcoming strategic discussions.
- **Ethiopia** — Plans to develop a joint study on one of three topics (nexus, climate finance, or food systems), which would act as a high visibility product to support national positioning.
- **Nepal** — Actively planning joint communication around EU Global Gateway work and future advocacy papers.
- **Pakistan** — Plans to enhance Alliance2015 visibility at country level, especially in relation to joint programmes and shared learning exchanges.
- **Malawi** — Plans joint press briefings tied to the GHI launch and Food Systems Analysis dissemination, as well as joint presentations to new government officials.
- **Uganda** — Intends to use the MSNA report for joint advocacy and communication.

Overall, planned joint trainings are more common than planned visibility products, and many countries see training as a low-risk entry point for collaboration.

Countries with clear, structured upcoming plans:

- **Liberia** — Planning joint country learning visits and joint programme reviews.
- **Pakistan** — Extensive training plans linked to disaster risk reduction, climate resilience, information systems, and capacity-building under ongoing multi-year programmes.
- **Uganda** — Preparing security training.
- **Malawi** — Preparing learning sessions on finance and operations, plus training linked to joint emergency response planning.
- **Sierra Leone** — Plans joint monitoring visits and learning documentation related to livelihoods, gender, and food systems.

Joint Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning (JEPREP)

Twelve countries - Afghanistan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Lebanon, Malawi, Myanmar, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Uganda - **foresee working on Joint Emergency preparedness and Response Planning in 2026.**

- **Afghanistan and Niger** expressed a clear interest in further discussing this approach. **Myanmar** highlighted the need to analyse the feasibility of implementing JEPREP in its specific context, while **Somalia** is considering the development of a broader regional programmatic strategy that could incorporate JEPREP.
- In **Bangladesh and India**, efforts will focus on regularly updating existing JEPREP plans. **Ethiopia**, which has already developed a JEPREP, aims to strengthen members' commitment to implementing the plan within their emergency responses.
- **Malawi** has expressed interest both in developing a JEPREP and in designating an Emergency Response Lead.
- In **Pakistan**, JEPREP development will continue, as it plays a key role in informing Alliance2015's positioning, capacity, and readiness to respond to emergencies.
- **Lebanon** noted that, given the volatile context - particularly following a fragile ceasefire - there is a high likelihood of a major emergency situation requiring a response. In this context, joint initiatives, whether involving all members present in the country or a subset, would be worth exploring.

Other initiatives

Ten countries reported **plans for future initiatives that go beyond the main categories** of collaboration outlined earlier. Across countries, discussions on joint initiatives remain at **varying stages**, with several common themes emerging.

A number of countries (e.g. **Honduras, Lao PDR, Syria, Tajikistan**) are still in **exploratory phases**, focusing on identifying opportunities (emergency response or DRR) for collaboration, complementarities, and potential joint programming or fundraising. In **Sudan**, this will begin with a mapping exercise to better understand linkages.

Others are moving toward more concrete collaboration areas. **Ethiopia** stands out with planned engagement with government stakeholders (particularly the FDRE Authority for Civil Society Organizations (ACSO)), potential joint research (on nexus, climate finance, or food systems), and early discussions on a joint strategic approach for COP32 in 2027. **Pakistan** is already collaborating through FCDO and ECHO-funded projects, while the **Philippines** focuses on coordination and alignment of messaging in national platforms (PINGON).

Operational collaboration is also a key trend. Mozambique and Somalia emphasize cooperation on security, logistics, and cost-sharing, with Somalia already implementing practical arrangements such as shared office space (in Galkayo between CESVI and CONCERN) and accommodation (hosting of CESVI staff in ACTED guesthouse in Mogadishu). **Tajikistan** is similarly considering co-location and shared resources to reduce costs for 2027.

Overall, while some countries have already initiated concrete joint actions, most are still building foundations for future collaboration, particularly in programming, advocacy, and operational efficiency.

Country visits

Across respondents, there is a **strong demand for greater support from the Hub**, particularly through in-country visits seeing as a way to help advance joint planning and collaboration.

Several countries (e.g. Afghanistan, India, Yemen) highlighted that a Hub visit could help sharpen joint strategic planning, prioritisation, and resource mobilisation efforts. Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nepal specifically emphasised the need for support in advocacy, resource mobilisation, and donor engagement, as well as identifying collective strengths.

A number of countries are also looking to **strengthen visibility and collaboration mechanisms**. **Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo** pointed to the importance of joint visibility tools and enhancing Alliance2015's presence at country level, alongside opportunities for joint programmes and learning exchanges.

Others remain at earlier stages of collaboration. **Liberia** noted operational constraints but expressed interest in exploring cost-saving measures and deeper cooperation, while also facing practical limitations such as existing rental agreements. More broadly, several countries indicated willingness to engage further but require structured support and facilitation to move forward.

Overall, there is a clear interest in strengthening joint approaches, with particular emphasis on resource mobilisation, visibility, and strategic alignment, alongside a **strong expectation of support from the Hub to help catalyse progress**.

Digitalisation

Countries such as Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Haiti, Malawi, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone, identified a range of opportunities to leverage digitalisation to strengthen collaboration, efficiency, and programme impact.

A common priority is the development of shared systems and tools, particularly for data management and analysis. For instance, Afghanistan and Pakistan highlighted the potential for joint information management systems, digital data collection tools, and the use of artificial intelligence to support evidence-based decision-making and programme design. Others emphasised the role of digital platforms in improving service delivery and learning, including access to online training and resources.

Several countries also pointed to the value of digitalisation in enhancing accountability and coordination. Bangladesh noted opportunities around digital feedback and complaints response mechanisms (FCRM) and broader use of ICT in programming, while Sierra Leone and Haiti highlighted the potential of partner “passporting” systems to facilitate information sharing and streamline documentation processes.

In addition, digital innovation is seen as a way to address sector-specific challenges and expand impact. Malawi, for example, referenced the use of digital applications such as the Zaulimi App to support food and nutrition security, while Albania underlined the applicability of digital tools across sectors, including local governance, private sector development, and youth employment.

Overall, some countries see digitalisation as a key enabler for more integrated, efficient, and forward-looking collaboration, with strong potential for joint initiatives across multiple areas.

4. Tools and Practical Collaboration

4.1 Use of Alliance2015 Tools

Across countries, **awareness and use of Alliance2015 tools is uneven**. A core group of countries—particularly those with higher engagement levels—actively reported using Consortium Lead Guidelines, MoU / Partnership Agreement templates, Teaming Agreements, Advocacy Strategies, and Emergency Toolkits. These tools were most frequently cited in Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Pakistan, Nepal, Uganda, Somalia, and Niger, where they supported proposal development, emergency preparedness, advocacy positioning, or partner due diligence processes. In contrast, many low engagement or single member contexts (e.g. Cambodia, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Mali) explicitly stated that no tools were used, often due to limited collaboration or lack of familiarity. A recurring message across multiple countries is that tools are considered useful when known and applied, but dissemination, onboarding, and practical guidance remain gaps.

Countries frequently ask for:

- More visibility of available tools, as many claim they “didn’t know they existed”
- Short briefs or case examples instead of long documents
- A regularly updated dashboard of ongoing Alliance2015 initiatives

4.2 Participation in Alliance2015 Learning and Info Sessions

Participation in Alliance2015-organized Info Sessions and webinars was reported by a moderate number of countries, with positive feedback almost universally where participation occurred.

Countries such as Haiti, Malawi, Nepal, Liberia, India, Pakistan, Niger, and Ethiopia highlighted sessions on due diligence passporting, shared resources, emergency preparedness (JEPREP), and advocacy as particularly useful. These sessions helped reduce duplication, improve understanding of Alliance2015 mechanisms, and sparked ideas for future collaboration. However, many countries (especially those with lower engagement) reported no participation, often citing lack of awareness or limited relevance to their immediate context. Several respondents requested more regular, targeted, and practical Info Sessions, including shorter webinars, country focused exchanges, or experience sharing from peers.

Frequently requested themes for future Info Sessions include:

- **Donor intelligence and resource mobilisation**, particularly related to EU funding instruments, Global Gateway, climate finance, and private sector engagement;
- **Joint advocacy and positioning**, including how to develop effective joint position papers and engage policymakers;
- **Cost-sharing and operational collaboration**, with practical guidance on administrative cost sharing, co-location, and shared services;
- **Emergency preparedness, anticipatory action, and nexus approaches**, building on interest in JEPREP and crisis response coordination;
- **Civil society partnerships and localisation**, including joint due-diligence models and partnership passporting;
- **Digitalisation and innovation**, such as data systems, information management, and the use of digital tools to support joint programming.

4.3 Resource Sharing & Operational Collaboration

Actual **cost-sharing between members remains relatively limited and pragmatic**, rather than strategic. Where it does occur, it most often involves shared office space, guesthouse accommodation, warehouses, vehicles, or security arrangements. These arrangements are usually bilateral and context-specific, driven by operational necessity rather than formal Alliance2015 frameworks. Several countries expressed interest in expanding cost-sharing (e.g. administrative costs, logistics, co-location), but highlighted the need for clear guidance, templates, and examples to do so safely and equitably.

In contrast to cost sharing, **information sharing is widespread and forms the backbone of collaboration in most countries**. Commonly shared information includes security updates, regulatory changes, donor intelligence, partner due diligence insights, and operational coordination. This is typically facilitated through WhatsApp groups, email lists, ad hoc meetings, and coordination forums. Even in low engagement contexts, information sharing was often cited as the minimum and most consistent form of Alliance2015 collaboration. Several countries noted that formalizing and systematizing information sharing (e.g. shared databases, dashboards, or structured donor intelligence exchanges) could significantly enhance collective effectiveness.

4.4 How the Hub Could Better Support Country Teams

A very strong and consistent message across countries is the request for more proactive, practical, and continuous Hub engagement, beyond annual reporting.

Key recurring needs include:

1. Strategic facilitation and coordination

Some countries (e.g. Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, Niger, Tajikistan, Yemen) asked for Hub support in:

- Structuring country level engagement strategies, including joint advocacy
- Facilitating prioritisation of joint initiatives
- Supporting leadership transitions (e.g. identifying or onboarding Lead Agencies)

2. Donor intelligence and positioning support

Countries requested:

- Timely donor intelligence, guidance on when and how to position collectively
- Support in navigating shrinking or highly competitive funding environments
- (e.g. Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone).

3. Sharing good practices and lessons learned from other countries

Many countries explicitly stated they would benefit from:

- Short case studies
- Webinars or experience sharing sessions
- Examples of what “worked” and what didn’t in other Alliance2015 contexts.

Countries see the Hub as an enabler and connector, rather than an implementer, and want more structured but light touch accompaniment.

4.5 Strategy Relevant Single Member Initiatives

Although the report focuses on joint action, many countries used this column to highlight **single member initiatives that are highly relevant to the Strategic Compass**.

Common thematic clusters include:

1. Food systems and nutrition

- Examples from Afghanistan, Liberia, Malawi, Ethiopia, India, and Pakistan, where members are implementing significant food security, nutrition, or value chain programmes aligned with Alliance2015 impact goals.

2. Climate resilience and adaptation

- Climate-focused initiatives were highlighted in Ethiopia, Pakistan, India, Tajikistan, Uganda, Yemen, often involving climate smart agriculture, resilience platforms, or climate finance pilots.

3. Civil society partnerships and localization

- Several countries (e.g. Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, Nepal) pointed to strong local partnership models or coalition work.

4.6 Other Relevant Feedback

1. Call for simplification

Several countries welcomed the effort to capture comprehensive information but suggested:

- Streamlining future reporting
- Focusing more on key results, added value, and learning, rather than exhaustive detail

2. Need for incentives and clarity

In lower engagement contexts, countries noted that:

- Collaboration often remains secondary to donor-driven consortia
- Stronger incentives or clearer value propositions would help elevate Alliance2015 as a preferred platform

3. Desire for continuity and follow-up

A recurring theme is that annual reporting alone is not sufficient. Countries suggested:

- Regular check-ins
- Follow-up on reported plans
- Tracking progress on joint initiatives over time

4. Strong openness to collaboration despite constraints

- Even in fragile or low-capacity contexts respondents expressed:
- Willingness to collaborate
- Interest in learning from others

5. Key Trends and Highlights

5.1 Barriers to Engagement (cross-cutting)

Recurring obstacles across 2025 submissions:

- Instability, registration barriers, or restrictive operations (Yemen, Iraq, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Syria).
- Declining opportunities from institutional donors and increased competition.
- Staff turnover disrupting continuity (Mozambique, CAR, several MENA countries).
- Low awareness of Alliance2015 tools and limited capacity to use them.
- Divergent organisational planning cycles and decision-making processes.

5.2 Good Practices Worth Sharing Across the Network

Top examples with replication potential:

- **Liberia's joint engagement model** (shared country plan, strong local CSO inclusion, coordinated donor and policy outreach).
- **Nepal's joint Global Gateway positioning** (model for structured EU engagement with Hub support).
- **Malawi's integration of local CSO coalitions** (20+ partners through the Right to Food Coalition) and proactive assessment of national context.
- **Somalia's regional strategy discussions** (cross-border model).
- **Haiti's practical resource sharing agreements** (low-cost, high-impact).
- **Ethiopia's engagement with multiple EU Delegation units** (expanding influence beyond traditional INTPA/ECHO).

5.3 Recommendations for the Hub

The most frequently requested Hub support for 2026:

1. A simple, regularly updated overview of all Alliance2015 global initiatives and existing tools
2. Strategic donor intelligence for joint funding opportunities (especially the EU & Climate Funding) & support for joint donor engagement
3. Facilitated cross-country knowledge sharing on:
 - Climate finance
 - Food systems
 - Civil society partnerships
 - Digitalisation

4. Support for in-country advocacy, especially on local governance and development, climate-resilient agriculture and food sovereignty.
5. Additional guidance on:
 - Cost-sharing templates
 - Operational integration models
 - JEPREP and emergency collaboration
6. Targeted support visits to countries with high engagement potential
7. Short, practical guidance documents (instead of long templates)
8. Peer learning sessions and country-to-country exchanges

5.4 Closing

The 2025 reports show that countries are increasingly ready and willing to collaborate, but require structured support, clearer opportunities, and targeted donor intelligence to fully activate the potential of Alliance2015.

Four major strategic orientations emerge for 2026:

1. **Strengthen impact across all areas of engagement** and gain greater institutional role.
2. **Invest in cross-country learning and regionalisation**, which is already emerging organically.
3. **Engage systematically local civil society partners** to effectively reach out to in-country authorities.
4. **Strengthen Alliance2015 visibility with donors**, especially EU and climate finance actors—where many countries see immediate potential.

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